The Henry Gun Works and the impact of the federal contract system (1808-1830) by Carden, James T.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
1998
The Henry Gun Works and the impact of the
federal contract system (1808-1830)
James T. Carden
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carden, James T., "The Henry Gun Works and the impact of the federal contract system (1808-1830)" (1998). Theses and Dissertations.
Paper 526.
Carden, James
The Henry Gun
Works and the
Impact of the
Federal Contract
System (1808-
1830)
May 13,1998
The Henry Gun Works and the Impact of the Federal Contract System
(1808-1830)
by
James T. Carden
A Thesis
Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee
ofLehigh University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Master ofArts
m
History
Lehigh University
April 30, 1998

Table of Contents
illustration List tv
Introduction 1
The Emergence ofthe Federal Private Contract System 3
Federal Contracts and Pre-War Manufacturing Problems 8
Post-War Diversification and Subcontracting 24
Conclusion 40
Endnotes 43
Vita SO
111
ILWSIRATIONS
Figure 1. The Henry Papers: Original Documents; Box # 5, Generalized Map ofHenry
Properties, Historic Structures Report: The Henry Homestead Boulton, PA Prepared for
the Jacobsburg Historical Society by Reed Lawrence Engle 1978, Hagely Museum and
Library, Wilmington, DE
Figure 2. The Boulton Factory built 1812-1813. drawn by the author and taken from a
post-production photograph in Dech, Newell and Wright p 1
Figure 3. The Henry Papers: Original Documents; Box # 2, John Joseph Henry
Sketchbook, Internal Diagram ofLock Mechanism, Hagely Museum and Library,
Wilmington, DE
Figure 4. Gunsmiths ofthe Lehigh Valley based on a Northhampton County Map found
in the Special Collections Section ofthe Easton Public Library. Easton,PA. General
locations ofgunsmiths based on County tax and will records
Figure 5. The Henry papers: Original Documents; Box # 2, John Joseph Henry
Sketchbook, Patch box designs for trade guns, Hagely Museum and Library, Wilmington,
DE
Figure 6. Ibid., J.1. Henry Lock Plate Design
IV
Introduction
Histories ofnineteenth century arms production in America are rich in post 1816
studies but the period from 1808 to 1816 is often overlooked by arms historians. One
reason is perhaps the lack ofdocuments pertaining to this early period (many were
destroyed when the British burned Washington D.C.). But a far more important reason for
the neglect is that there was a climate ofchaos and uncertainty within the arms industry
which makes investigation ofthis period difficult. Such difficulties were encountered with
the undertaking ofthis paper which investigates the impact of the federal contract musket
system on a private gun works owned by the Henry family ofNazareth, Pennsylvania.
Initially this study was to be a chronological story ofthe evolution ofthe Henry gun
works. Research ofletters and documents soon turned the paper in another direction. The
story instead focuses on the federal contracts obtained ·by the Henrys and the problems
created for them by the War Department's drive for uniformity ofparts and the inaccurate
inspection system it set up to oversee private production ofmartial arms.
The Henry gun works story during the period 1808 to the 1830's may at first
seem narrow but after researching the period it has proven to be reflective ofthe problems
faced by the larger federal armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry. Although I was
unable to find as much information about other private gun works it can be surmised that
they too were experiencing problems. A common theme in the letters and records ofboth
private and federal gun makers at this time was dissatisfaction with the War Department's
methods ofinspection, the vagaries ofwhich could push firms to the brink ofbankruptcy
or even over it.
In 1808 the War Department increased its call on both federal and private armories
to produce muskets. Although covering the Henry story from 1808 through the 1830's,this
paper will concentrate on the period from 1808 to 1816 and what part the Henrys played
in the federal contract musket story. The Henrys, like many private contractors signed on
with the government and began producing muskets under the War Department's special
guidelines which called for federally manufactured pattern guns to be used as a model for
the private gun makers to mirror. The pattern gun would also be used by federal
inspectors to check for uniformity ofparts on the guns manufactured. Uniformity ofparts
was the main goal ofthe War Department but they had no idea ofhow to achieve it.
Inaccurate visual inspections seemed to be the answer but it left the door open for a great
deal ofhuman error which as this paper will show nearly destroyed the Henry family's
business. The Henrys' story was not one ofincreased profits, but instead a nightmare of
delays, rejections and lawsuits. Only through diversification and subcontracting during and
after the War of 1812, would the Henrys survive the impact ofthe disastrous federal
inspection system. Tragically their survival would be short lived and the gun works began
a slow death in the 1830's. By the Civil War the Henry family was no longer able to
compete with other federal and private contractors. The private gun industry could not
sustain them and they ceased production by the turn ofthe century.
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The Emergence of the Federal Private Contract System
Traditionally small arms production in early nineteenth century America has been
seen by historians as the birthplace ofinterchangeable parts and to a lesser extent modern
mass production techniques. More careful studies suggest it is only partially correct,
instead machine based interchangeability or mass production capabilities were developed
by the Ford Motor Company in the 191O's[l] What was established by small arms
producers in the first halfofthe nineteenth century was hand finished interchangeable
parts and the groundwork for limited mechanized production ofarms and their parts (as
seen with Blanchard's stock lathe used at the Federal Armories) which in turn helped bring
the weapons industry one step closer to true machine based interchangeability. It was
during the first two decades ofthe nineteenth century that the federal government
established the ultimate goal ofinterchangeability which in turn caused both large and
small scale gun works to push their efforts in that direction. In 1808 the government
offered large weapons contracts based on the standards set by the,pattern muskets
produced by the federal army at Harpers Ferry. [2] These seemingly lucrative contracts
appeared attractive to many small private gun works. But for the small gun works, these
contracts and the federal standards contained potential risks as well as potential rewards.
Inability to meet the standards set by the federal armories and the resulting failure to fulfill
government contracts might ruin a private small arms producer. Successful gun works
either adapted to the new federal standards or, as with the Henry gun works described in
this paper, diversified their production often by subcontracting work for states or larger
gun works which held federal contracts.
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The federal government was the major catalyst for changes in early nineteenth
century small arms production. Federal armories at Harpers ferry and Springfield had been
established for the production of small arms. Inspired by French officers Toussard and
Gribeauval's concept of"system and uniformity" in ordnance, the first ChiefofU. S.
Ordnance, Colonel Decius Wadsworth, in 1815 urged "uniformity, simplicity and
solidarity" in small arms production.[3]
.Earlier, in 1812 Wadsworth had formulated a strategy to solve the problems of
creating uniformity in small arms parts by using pattern muskets for visual comparisons
with all parts produced. Parts would be hand finished to match the pattern gun parts.
Federal inspectors were appointed to oversee the production ofsmall arms and more
importantly, to approve or reject the arms produced at private as well as federal gun
works. At first the inspection was purely visual with the one exception ofproving barrels
for the metal's tolerance (not until 1816 would a set ofpatterns muskets and gauges be
used to measure the parts and rifles produced thus improving the uniformity and
inspection process).From 1808 to 1816 it was this visual inspection system and the
inspectors themselves that would prove to be the weak link in assuring uniformity ofgun
parts to ensure standardization at all federally contracted private gun works. The Henry
gun works at Jacobsburg, Pennsylvania was one such contracted private facility.
The Henry family's gunsmith roots went back to the eighteenth century when it
was part ofthe "Pennsylvania School" oflongrifle craftsmen. Desiring to expand his
business, William Henry nmoved his gun works in 1792 from Nazareth, Pennsylvania to a
site on the Bushkill Creek near Jacobsburg. (see Figure [1] General Map ofHenry
Properties) The creek provided water power which was essential for the transition from
craft production to industrial production ofsmall arms. The water could power grinders
and lathes for turning barrels. Although the move took until 1798 to complete, the He~s
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- believed they were ready for large scale production by 1797 and obtained their first post-
Revolutionary War cont~ct for the production ofmartial arms from the ',State of
Pennsylvania. The contract called for the production of2,000 muskets b~ed on the 1763
French Charlevi1le pattern musket. [4] The contract was fulfilled and the Henrys prospered.
By 1807 William Henry's son, John Joseph Henry, opened a gun works and showroom in
Philadelphia called "The American Rifle Manufactory". This expansion gave the Henrys
access to new markets. In 1808 William Henry II erected an iron forge near Jacobsburg,
to make wrought iron from pig iron, vertically integrating his growing gun works. The
time seemed right to apply for a federal musket contract.
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figure 1: Genua/ked Map ofHenry Family Properties 1812-1832
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Jefferson's Embargo Act created a political climate in which war with Great Britain
seemed imminent. Prompted by this tense atmosphere, the War Department on may 12,
1808, once again eager for more muskets than its federal armories at Harpers Ferry and
Springfield could provide, appealed to private contractors:
Proposals in writing will be received by this department until the first day of
August next, for manufacturing Muskets with Bayonets, ofthe kind and
dimensions manufactured at the U. States Armouries at Springfield, Mass-
achusetts and at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, every part to correspond in
dimensions, materials, marksmanship, and proofwith the samples which
will be given from one ofthe others armouries or from Mr. Whitney's
Armoury at New Haven in Connecticut. [5]
The federal proposal also stipulated that each musket should not cost the government
more than ten dollars and seventy five cents to produce. Private contractors could have up
to five years to produce 500 to 2,000 stands ofarms per year depending on the individual
contract:(a stand equals one complete musket and bayonet) [6] These federal contracts
created a carrier industry which was the key to transforming small gun works into large
scale industrial production facilities. Like today, obtaining such a handsome federal
contract meant a guaranteed market and buyer. Many owners ofsmall private gun works
believed they could make the transitions in scale and scope necessary to obtain and fulfill
these contracts. The Henry family shared in this optimistic view ofits production potential
and ability to transform its gun works. This transition however, would prove harder to
attain than the federal contracts themselves.
The Federal Government wanted muskets based on the French model 1777
Charleville pattern. This pattern was quite similar to the 1763 pattern musket the Henrys
had produced for the state ofPennsylvania, the only visible difference being the placement
ofthe barrel band springs which kept the barrel bands from sliding. This American version
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ofthe Charleville, although produced as early as the 1790's, would later become known as
the "modeI181611 after the year when the federal government adopted it as the primary
pattern musket for all gun works to produce and introduced a system ofgauges to
improve uniformity. The IImodel 181611 would become the mainstay ofthe United States
Anny until 1840. It was a .69 caliber, three band, flintlock musket. Although the muskets
were to be produced using federally supplied pattern muskets as a visual comparison to
ensure uniformity there is no indication that individual parts produced were ever fit into
the pattern part they matched. It seems that all inspections involved imprecise visual
inspections and even the weighing ofbarrels and completed muskets to prove they were
indeed standardized!
After 1816 sets ofgauges would improve uniformity ofparts. By the 1820's
mechanical lathes for turning both gun stocks and barrels as well as for rifling barrels had
been developed further improving the quality of the standardization in the parts being
produced. At this point the long sought after goal ofinterchageability began to appear to
be feasible for an actual production process. Despite such innovations at the federally
contracted gun works, true interchangeability was never achieved until the 1840's. From
the large federal armories to smaller gun works such as the Henrys', filers and fitters were
still an essential part ofproduction and the federal inspection system itselfwas highly
subjective and in the end the guns produced were not truly interchangeable until 1842
when interchangeability between Harpers Ferry weapons and Springfield weapons was
achieved using through the use ofHall's milling machines which drastically cut the
finishing work .[7] The success ofinterchangeability in the 1840's reflected thirty years of
development including the chaotic period before 1816.
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Federal Contracts and Pre-War Manufacturing Problems
In 1808, the Henry gun works at Jacobsburg seemed well equipped for the job of
producing federal contract muskets; water power for lathes and grinders, a staffof fitters
filers and finishers, and even an iron forge were all on hand. William Henry II wrote an
ambitious proposal to the Secretary ofWar, Henry Dearborn, on June 30, 1808.
"We may make and deliver three thousand stand yearly and expect in the course of
a few years could increase that number considerably. And I have now nearly ready
prepared has been a great desideratum, and much work has been lost in the Gun
factories in consequence ofBar Iron being too raw or insufficiently refined. I also
mean to make an [attempt.] at manufacturing of a better steel than has hitherto
been produced in the United States."[8]
In Henry's proposal one sees the roots ofvertical integration with his own iron forge, and
his own source for pig iron from New Jersey. The need for quality domestic pig iron was
great since the majority ofquality iron being used at this time was imported from
England.[9] The Henry gun works seemed to possess all the key elements for success in
large scale contract musket production. All it lacked for production was the federal
pattern muskets and ofcourse, a contract. Ultimately, however, a contract was agreed to
stipulating that 2,000 stands ofarms at ten dollars and seventy five cents each be delivered
annually to the U.S. arsenal in Philadelphia over five years. [10] It is unclear whether this
initial contract was to involve pattern muskets for uniformity.
The lack ofaccurate gauges and pattern muskets for the production of
standardized parts was not unique to the Henrys. Machine-based interchangeability was
still a dream in 1808 and gun works lacked the ability to produce interchangeable parts
even with the use offilers and fitters. True machine based interchangeable parts would
come even later in history although the federal government's drive for such parts would
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produce some great pretenders at having achieved it. The most famous ofthese pretenders
was Eli Whitney who argued that he had penected interchangeable parts around 1800.
Historians oftechnology have shown that in fact true interchangeability eluded most
contractors including Whitney.[II] Surviving Whitney weapons do not in fact possess
machine based interchangeable parts but instead have parts that were filed and fitted by
artisans. What Whitney really perfected was a limited amount of amazingly well matched
hand finished interchangeable parts that helped him protract his federal contract by fooling
the government into thinking that he had indeed achieved true interchangeabilty with his
horse pistols.
Historians now trace the roots ofpractical interchangeable parts to John Hall and
Simeon North whose collaboration gave rise to various milling machine tools which
allowed for more precise and exacting production ofweapons parts. [12] But such
machine-based interchangeabiltiy would not become common in the small arms industry
until well after the Civil War. [13] In 1808 the only way to ensure that federal contract
weapons were ofuniform pattern and quality was through hand fitting and finishing with a
subsequent visual comparison ofthe weapon to the pattern musket provided by the federal
government which was a far cry from the idea ofeither uniformity or interchangeability.
The government sought a way to ensure that all contract weapons were uniform no matter
from what gun works they came. The Federal Ordnance Department was not yet created
in 1808 and Colonel Decius Wadsworth's guidelines for uniform weaponry through the
use ofstandardized gauges would not be implemented until 1816. Yet private and federal
arms producers had been fulfilling musket contracts since the early 1800's thus the
government tried to monitor and influence the private production of small arms so as to
meet federal expectations.
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How were these federal expectations presented by the government and met by
small private gun works prior to the establishment ofthe Ordnance Department in 1812
and the introduction of standardized gauges in 18161 It seems that by 1808 the War
Department had come up with a system ofstandardization for all gun works to follow. An
indication as to how the government pushed for standardization was detailed by Tench
Coxe in a War Department notice dated December 8, 1808. Coxe, Purveyor ofPublic
Supplies in Philadelphia, sent guidelines to all independent private contractors in his
district, including the Henry family:
The importance ofgood arms is manifest. They are indeed necessary.
The lives ofour fellow citizens '" depend upon the excellence oftheir
arms. There being delivered with punctuality, and in due season, are also
essential to prudence, and may be so to the public safety.... It
has been found easy to keep the workmen at the armories to the
manufacturing of such arms as I have received through the War Depart-
ment from Harpers Ferry. Two stands have been retained as patterns,
and the others have been delivered to the contractors, to aid them in
keeping their workmen to uniformity and goodness ofworkmanship,
as well in the fitting or joining ofthe parts, as in the form and finish of
those respectively. [14]
In addition to the "pattern" guns being sent, the War Department was also sending
federal inspectors whose main job would be inspecting and proving the weapons produced
by private contractors. Through a qualitative visual inspection they made their
conclusions. Their inspection involved the disassembly ofthe lock mechanism and a visual
inspection ofparts before it was reassembled and the lock action fired. There were no
gauges used to check the musket, only calipers to check dimensions ofbarrel size and
caliber against the pattern musket's sample part. [15] What is most important here is that
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there appears to have been no testing ofparts for fit to the pattern musket's parts,
inspection depended mainly on the judgment ofthe inspector.
Daniel Pettibone was the first inspector to arrive at the Henry gun works in
Philadelphia. His stay was short lasting from June 30 to October 11 of 1809. As Pettibone
stated in an undated letter to John Joseph Henry: "I did not inspect many muskets for you,
probably not more than one hundred ofthem I considered better than the pattern .. .I
recollect that you had another parcel that I was about to inspect but was informed by Mr.
Coxe the Purveyor, that a Mr. Charles Williams had arrived from the Eastern states, and
he would complete all the inspections ofmuskets in the future. "[16] It is interesting that
Pettibone states he judged only 100 muskets to be better than the pattern
musket. Unfortunately he did not discuss the quality ofthe other arms he inspected
although one could surmise that many were at least equal to the pattern musket in quality,
thus the potential to manufacture quality contract muskets did exist.
Prior to leaving the Henry gun works, Pettibone would be joined by Charles
Williams. Williams' takeover ofpower did not sit well with Pettibone, but there was more
to fuel his dislike ofWilliams. Before Williams' appointment as ChiefInspector, Pettibone
had occasion to dispute Williams' professional judgment and qualifications as an inspector
ofuniformity of arms. Writing to John Joseph Henry, Pettibone recalled, "I have to
observe that on the morning ofthe 27th September 1809, I was at the Purveyor's office.
He stated that Mr. Williams had made a valuable improvement by weighing the musket
barrels to produce a
uniformity. I remonstrated against the plan, as it did not place the metal in its proper
situation. And in lieu thereof suggested proper gauges to produce a uniformity in size of
calibre, shapes and lengths. "[17] Apparently the two inspectors never came to an
agreement on how to establish uniformity, although the idea ofusing gauges would be
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adopted by War Department later in 1816. Personal rivalries between inspectors or
vendettas against private manufacturers ensured that the federal inspection system would
be flawed from the start. Private contractors like the Henry family suffered the most from
these personal conflicts which they were often caught in the middle ofor even worse, the
target of
Federal inspectors like Williams had the potential to destroy a private contractor
regardless ofthe quality ofits arms. As Coxe wrote to John Joseph Henry, "Mr. Charles
Williams, formerly ofthe United States armories in Virginia, at New London and Harper's
Ferry ... will be strict in rejecting really inefficient and inferior muskets or bayonets. 11[18]
True to his reputation, Williams rejected the majority ofthe muskets being produced at the
Henry gun works in Philadelphia. His rejections were based on his view that the
production muskets did not match the pattern muskets in finished parts and barrel
specifications. Williams was never really clear on exactly how the muskets did not match
however. To confuse the process even further he even called for alterations to the
government issued pattern muskets which Pettibone as well as the Henrys objected to. As
Pettibone stated, "Any alteration in the pattern requires an alteration oftools which must
be always attended with a very considerable expense."[19] Although Pettibone does not
clarify what tools would need to be altered he was most likely referring to forging and
bending tools (in one case new swages, used in bending metals, were created to appease
Williams.) The Henrys couId not afford such expenses nor such a fickle inspector as
Williams. Matters went from bad to worse when Pettibone was recalled from the Henry
gun works and was replaced by Jacob Shough. [20] It is not clear exactly what length of
time each inspector spent at the Henry gun works. The infighting among these inspectors
is best illustrated by the 1812 testimony ofWilliam Mayweg on behalfofthe Henrys:
12
William Mayweg ofthe Northern Liberties ofthe City ofPhiladelphia mounting
forger doth declare and say that in 1808 deponent was engaged with his father Jno.
Mayweg in forging gun mountings for Mr. 1. Jos. Henry after the pattern furnished
him by the United States, that before Mr. [Charles] Williams, the Inspector, had
arrived in the city, they had forged and filed a considerable quantity ofmountings,
of some parts more, & some less, as conforming to the pattern. Mr. Williams
looked at the work & objected to the same. When this depondent and his father
compared the work with the pattern, and showed that it was like the pattern,
Williams said the pattern should not be followed, that it was not worth a damn,
that it was the work of apprentices, that it had been better thrown overboard.
Williams himselfthen fell to & filed a different pattern and obliged us to make new
swages, by which we worked for some time.... Afterwards, whilst Mr. Williams
was gone to the Eastern States, Mr. [Daniel] Pettibone took his place as Inspector
and he insisted upon various alterations in various parts ofthe mountings and it
was complied with. Pettibone alleged that Williams knew nothing about forging,
though he was a filer. When again, on Mr. Williams' return to the city, we were
again compelled to change our work and return to his directions. And afterwards,
on appointment ofMr. Shough as Inspector, we were frequently embarrassed in
the same manner, in particular in relation to a quantity oframrods Mr. Henry
engaged us to furnish them according to the pattern. I had made a considerable
quantity. Williams before had changed the form & size ofthe head. Shough swore
he would condemn every rod that was made after this pattern, that neither the
original pattern rod should be followed, that we were obliged to make the said rod
head as large as to fill the bore ofthe barrel, that neither of said Inspectors would
permit the workmen to follow the pattern. [21]
In Mayweg's testimony he states "Pettibone alleged that Williams knew nothing
about forging though he was a filer." It would seem from this statement that the federal
government was employing filers as inspectors. Although this was probably not
uncommon as a filer would know many ofthe details ofmusket parts, would he be
qualified to visually judge the overall quality ofa musket? Again too much was left to
human error and prejudice in the inspection process. Williams, Pettibone and Shough not
only disagreed with each other, Williams went so far as to reject the pattern musket and
file his own version ofthe pattern thus ensuring that these muskets would be different
from the original pattern musket. Together, Williams and Shough rejected a large portion
ofthe Henrys' production muskets. From 1808 to 1811 these rejections caused
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tremendous delays. As a result they could not fulfill their contracts. By 1810 Coxe was
threatening to sue them over the unfulfilled contracts. In response, John Joseph Henry
wrote Coxe on November 20, 1810, "we should prefer a suit at law to the being harassed
and abused by the purveyor ... as to the quality of arms we were bound to furnish. "[22]
The Henrys had produced 4,200 muskets since 1808. This was a commendable output of
arms for a small private gun works when compared to the Springfield Armory which
annually produced about 7,000 muskets during this period and Harpers Ferry Armory
which produced 2,595 muskets in 1808 and 7,348 in 1809 [23] Although the Henrys were
just 1,800 short oftheir quota for the three year contract, the government persisted in its
stand.[24]
Apparently the Henrys were not alone in their problems with the federal
inspectors. Pettibone noted problems with Williams' drive for perfection in a letter to John
Joseph Henry, "I can further note as it respects Mr. Williams that contractors for muskets
made complaints to me, that they considered him too vigorous as he demanded better
work than their pattern. Sir, I conceive that Mr. Williams' anxiety to do public good did
not consider it his duty to attend strictly to equal justice."[25] It seems from Pettibone's
statement that Williams was overzealous in his inspections not only ofthe Henry muskets
but for other contractors' muskets. Ofcourse Pettibone's observations could be a result of
his personal differences with Williams, and those "other contractors" who complained
might have been producing low quality arms. This leads to two questions. First, what
armories were making quality arms, and second, what was the relationship like between
these producers and their federal inspectors? To answer this one can turn to the
Springfield Armory during this period.
The Springfield Armory was a federal armory with a reputation for producing
superior quality weapons which were preferred by military authorities for their
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reHability.[26] Both the Harpers Ferry and Springfield Armories were engaged in the
manufacture ofmuskets but it was the Harpers Ferry pattern arms that would be used to
establish uniformity throughout all arms production facilities. The arms produced at the
Springfield Armory were subject to the inspection system as well. Despite the reputation
for quality arms, the Springfield arms makers encountered troubles with the inspection
system and the inspectors themselves. Benjamin Prescott, Superintendent ofthe
Springfield Armory, wrote to Decius Wadsworth Chiefof Ordnance on July 15, 1813
expressing his concern over the waste and delays caused during the War of 1812 by an
inspector named Mr. Moore.
If the ridiculous system of inspection had not been adopted here more
than twice the number now required could have been repaired and made equally
as efficient months before this and with far less expense than barely the inspection
has cost the public. Can it be supposed that Moore who was bred a forger and
has never done anything else until 1810, is as well qualified for inspecting Gun
Work as men in this factory who have been employed in that business most of
them ten and some ofthem fifteen years. The Secretary ofWar when I had the
honour ofseeing him seemed to have an idea that the muskets manufactured here
were not inspected before they were turned into store. It maybe proper to state
to you sir, the system established in the Armory to that effect, first then I have a
man to straighten the inside ofthe barrels before grinding, that the barrel may be
ofequal thickness, second, one to see to the proof and all defects afterwards,
third, one to straight the barrel after polishing, fourth, one to inspect the locks
as they are filed, fifth, one to inspect the stockings, sixth, one to inspect the
forged work and seventh one to inspect the muskets after they are finished.
These are the inspectors alluded to by Moore in his letter to the Secretary of
War under date Nov. 11, 1812 in which he suggests that one would be fully
adequate, and at the same time observes that three hundred barrels have been
set aside which appear to have been overlooked, this requires no comment. I
could say much more on the above subject but I forbear giving you further
trouble at present. Mr. Moore left here on Tuesday for the Southward and I
sincerely believe it will be much for the public interest ifhe should not be sent
here again. [27]
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Despite Prescott's protests Moore would remain until 1815. Throughout this
period Prescott charged that Moore and his confederates were knowingly sabotaging
the manufacture ofmuskets at Springfield. In a confidential note to Decius Wadsworth
dated August 5, 1813 Prescott warned ofMoore's actions.
"Ifthe government knew what a shameful waste has been made here ofthe Public
for a party in consequence ofthis foolish system ofinspection they would be
astonished that circumstances would insist to holding an investigation for nearly
one year but the influence ofMr. Irvine accounts for the whole. I have only to
observe at this time that Moore is the ostensible head ofa faction, the near one sits
behind the curtain and is employed in the pay office. The object of this faction is
[supposedly] known here.... I pray you to use your influence to have Moore
suspended while we get through with these arms for Burlington. I do not wish him
dismissed until an investigation has been had. "[28] .
No investigation was held and the problems with Moore continued.
Apparently Moore had some strong connections for he not only continued as an
inspector but boldly suggested changes to the federal inspection system while at the same
time Prescott was dismissed! He was fired so quickly that he could not take all ofhis files
and personal papers and subsequently spent the next two years lobbying for reinstatement
to his position. [29] Similar to Williams' proposal to change the pattern gun at the Henry
Works, Moore and his associate introduced a new and intricate pattern musket to replace
the original Charleville pattern musket at Springfield.
Prescott was reappointed Superintendent in 1815, and like the Henrys, Prescott
protested Williams' new pattern musket.[30] The costs ofre-tooling for such a transition
were prohibitive as he pointed out in a letter dated February 15, 1815 to Secretary ofWar
James Monroe;
"It cannot be denied but that Musket is a good one, but ifone equally as
serviceable can be made for one halfofthe expense why should it not be adopted.
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I believe the old Charleville Musket has from long experience been found as
efficient as any ever made, why then vary so materially from it, ... but what
constitutes the greatest difference is the ridiculous idea ofmaking the component
parts ofthe lock so perfect as to fit any other, until materials can be found to make
tools of, that will not wear by constant use it cannot be done. "[31]
Prescott refers to the concept ofinterchangeability as "ridiculous" even though one ofthe
first contracts mentioning interchangeble parts was with North's pistol contract in 1813.
Apparently the Ordnance Department envisioned gun production achieving
interchangeability while the men producing the weapons scoffed at the idea, realizing the
tools ofthe day were not up to the job. Such drives for interchangeability were costly and
ahead ofthe day's technology and as a consequence achieved nothing more than to delay
the manufacture ofdependable arms at a time when the nation was at war.
Like the Henry family, Prescott was also questioning the wisdom ofthe inspectors
and the push for a uniform system that now included interchangeable lock parts when the
tools ofthe day were not up to such a task. Unlike the Henrys however, Prescott was
finally able to dismiss his federal inspector on February 7, 1815. "I have discharged Mr.
Moore from the Armory. It was impossible for me to retain him for a moment after
believing as I do that he has destroyed thousands ofdollars worth ofpublic property in a
shameful manner from interested motives. "[32] Could this be an early version ofindustrial
sabotage? It is not clear just what this destruction entailed however the problem between
Prescott and Moore seemed to be more ofa political division - Prescott being a staunch
anti-Jeffersonian Federalist who opposed war with Britain, and Moore a Madison
appointee who supported the war. [33] This was not the end ofMoore's career as he was
later rehired as a Master ~orer by General John Armstrong, who had become the
Secretary ofWar. The Springfield Armory continued to make contract muskets for the
government and new inspectors continued to check for uniformity using the pattern
muskets until a system ofgauges was developed and incorporated into the inspection
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system in 1816, thus ending many ofthe problems ofthe earlier visual inspections using
pattern muskets alone. However as late as 1817 the federal armories at Harpers Ferry and
Springfield were still unable to achieve interarmory standardization. In 1816 Wadsworth's
chiefassistant, George Bomford informed the superintendent at Springfield, Roswell Lee
that he "regrets to observe a total disagreement between your pattern and that lately
received from Harpers Ferry. It was hoped and expected that there would have been great
coincidence with regard to their construction."[34] A year later Lee lamented, "It is
difficult ... to please everybody. Faults will realy [sic] exist & many imaginary ones will
be pointedout . . .It must consequently take some time to bring about a conformity ofthe
componenet parts ofthe Musket at both Establishments"[35]
While Springfield had its inspection problems and difficulty achieving interarmory
standardization, it did not deter the overall output and success ofthe armory. Vastly
greater than the Henry Gun Works in both scale and scope, the Springfield Armory could
absorb many ofthe losses incurred during this period, especially since it was a federal
armory whose funding source was the public treasury. Private gun manufacturers would
not fare as well. For the Henry family such losses were almost too much to handle. In
1811 William Henry petitioned Congress, seeking compensation for the losses his family
incurred under the scrutiny ofWilliams and the inspection system - a scrutiny which was
unjust and excessive in William Henry's eyes.
A short time after your memorialist had entered into Contract with the
United States they commenced making the necessary preparations for
carrying the Contract into effect on their part at a very heavy expense...that
in about three months after they had signed said contract they where furnished
with the pattern guns on the receipt ofthe patterns they entered upon the work
which was prosecuted with vigor and without delay... that after they had made
considerable progress in the work Mr. Charles Williams... arrived, who
immediately started objections to the patterns.... your memorialists further state
that Mr. Pettibone... again objected to improvements that Mr. Williams had
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directed, but both agreed to object the pattern gun. [36]
William Henry and his sons believed that the inspectors often rejected muskets that were
superior to the pattern muskets sent. Human error and federal inspectors' prejudice against
their weapons were taking a toll on the Henry family and their gun works.
During his dispute with the federal inspectors and the War Department, William
Henry and his mend General Robert Brown, a member ofCongress, appealed to the
Secretary ofWar for a standardized gauge or pattern system similar to the type Decius
Wadsworth was promoting. The extra cost ofimproving completed muskets to satisfy the
contradictory views ofgovernment inspectors was inefficient and expensive for both the
Henrys and the government. Out ofdesperation but also prophetically, William Henry
suggested "... introducing a Mathematical definition ofthe Musket desired by the
government in order that thereafter a settled principals in the manufacture ofthe muskets
be [bid?] on... had the principal been adopted, not only the uniformity in the arms would
have been the desirable result, but would have an emmence[sic] saving to the United
States."[37] William Henry was not trying to back out ofhis contract but instead was
attempting to streamline and refine the government's specifications, standards and
inspecting to avoid future problems. Ultimately by 1816 a gauge and pattern system based
on Wadsworth's proposals would be adopted by the Ordnance Department. Overall these
pattern and gauge sets would help contractors avoid some ofthe problems the Henrys had
faced, but it would be too late to help the Henrys save this government contract.[38]
Throughout 1811 William Henry continued to appeal to Congress for
compensation for the cost of reworking the muskets deemed unfit by Williams. He
suggested that the Henrys and the government tum over, "... the examination ofthe
musket to three impartial professional men, and submit to their decision. "[39] The
Secretary ofWar finally promised the Henrys that iftheir gun works continued
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manufacturing contract muskets, they would be compensated for the expenses already
incurred. Unfortunately the Henrys claimed they could not resume production ofa
sufficient number ofmuskets and "... the consequence was an institution ofa suit on behalf
of the U.S., which was subsequently withdrawn but which subjected [the Henrys] to much
disadvantage. 11[40] It is not clear as to why the Henrys could not resume production but
perhaps it had to do with the realization that they would be dealing with the federal
inspectors and that they would run into a repeat oftheir earlier difficulties. The
government did not sue but at the year's end canceled the contract and refused to
compensate the Henrys for the losses that occurred as a result ofthe federal inspectors'
infighting. The 1812 cancellation was a tremendous loss, especially as the Henrys had just
opened their new larger gun works at Boulton near Nazareth, Pennsylvania. (see Figure
[2J: The Boulton Factory, based on aphotograph)
State contracts brought on by the War of 1812 helped the Henrys recover from
their federal contract losses and by 1813 they were producing muskets for state contracts
with Maryland and Delaware. Both the Philadelphia and Boulton gun works produced
weapons and accoutrements during the war. With state contracts no federal inspector was
required so the Henrys were able to meet their contract quotas. The records ofJ. Joseph
Henry show that on August 21, 1812, Governor Haslet ofDelaware purchased 600
muskets at $13 each. On November 21 Haslet purchased another 795 muskets at $13
each. [41] Maryland also purchased 5,832 muskets from private suppliers. The majority of
these muskets (4,936) were manufactured and delivered by John Joseph Henry between
1813 and 1815. [42] The muskets delivered to Delaware and Maryland were essentially
the same as the contract muskets he made for the federal government. Although there was
the urgency ofwar, these states seemed quite willing to purchase large quantities ofHenry
muskets for a prolonged period which would allow for any defects in them to become
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apparent. There is no indication that these states were disappointed with the quality ofthe
Henry muskets. Again perhaps it was the quality of the federal inspectors, not the
muskets, that created such problems for the Henrys.
The Henrys also sold ship muskets (muskets with shorter barrels than the standard
Charleville pattern army musket) to both the federal navy and skippers of several
privateers that sailed the waters during the war. Records indicate that on March 3 and 12,
1814 Henry sold 535 ship muskets to George Harrison, a Navy purchasing agent.[43]
Reflecting the Henrys' product diversification, between July 1, 1812 and October 12, 1813
John Joseph Henry had sold 690 muskets, 145 pairs ofpistols, 300 cutlasses, 45 boarding
pikes and 16·boarding axes to various merchants who specialized in provisioning of
privateers and to the owners ofprivateers themselves. [44] On November 24, 1812 John
Joseph Henry and a fellow gun maker and business associate, Daniel Henkels bought one-
fiftieth shares in the privateer schooner Revenge. They had previously provisioned the
Revenge with 37 muskets, 45 pairs ofpistols, 16 boarding axes and 25 boarding pikes on
October 9, 1812.[45]
It was also during this time that the Henrys diversified into the production of
various musket parts and accoutrements. Their first sale ofsuch goods was a shipment of
barrels ofvarious sizes to Virginia. Other parts contracts followed as well as orders for
swords, pistols and cartridge boxes and through this approach the Henrys kept their gun
works in business. One ofthe more interesting and specialized weapons the Henrys
produced was the Chambers repeating musket. Joseph Gaston Chambers received a patent
in 1813 on his system of repeating arms. The musket's configuration and various reports
describe a system where 11 shots can be fired from one musket by discharging the
foremost musket ball and then via a sliding lock the subsequent charges would be fired
Roman Candle fashion with the final charge being fired by the rear ofthe flintlock. [46]
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In 1814, Secretary ofNavy William Jones directed George Harrison to purchase 200
muskets and 20 barrel swivel guns based on the Chambers patent. On February 16, 1814
Harrison contracted with a temporary partnership between John Joseph Henry and another
Philadelphia gun maker George W. Tryon. They were to manufacture the guns in a three
month period at $23 per musket and $100 per swivel gun.[47] Henry also sold the Navy
50 pairs ofcommon pistols and 48 British muskets that he altered to the Chambers
repeating system.[48] Records do not reveal why the navy was willing to contract with
Henry at a time when the Ordnance Department inspectors rejected his muskets for the
army.
By the end ofthe war the Henry family had recouped their losses and were
producing muskets and their parts for state contracts, private contracts and local
gunsmiths. It seemed the quality oftheir muskets was not questioned by the states. Indeed
the Henry gun works and their products seemed technologically sound to those who were
now contracting with them. The only real problem at the Henry gun works had been the
federal inspectors themselves. [49]
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Figure 2: The Boulton Fadol}' built 1812-1813.from aphotograph
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Post-War Diversification and subcontracting
Having re-established their financial stability, and their reputation as the makers of
quality muskets, the Henrys were ready to try for another lucrative federal contract despite
their previous experiences with federal inspectors such as Charles Williams ( who had
resigned his position as inspector to go into private business). Anticipating that the
government would open a new federal armory in Ohio, the Henrys hoped that this armory
might send some work their way as well. This work could be either finished muskets or
musket parts as the Henrys believed they had proved their proficiency at producing both
during the war.Despite their earlier experiences with federal contracts they decided to take
another stab at one. Perhaps their success with state contracts gave them a boost of
confidence that their workmanship could now withstand the scrutiny offederal inspectors.
On February 9, 1815 John Joseph Henry and his brother William Henry ill obtained a
federal contract for the odd number of2,277 muskets.[50] Further details ofthe contract
have been lost but records do show that after producing a few hundred muskets they once
again encountered problems in meeting their government contract quotas. Specific
problems were not identified in surviving papers but since the government would not
institute a set ofgauges and patterns for musket production until 1816, it can be surmised
that it was the federal inspection system and the inspectors themselves that were causing
the problems. Once again the Henry family was in financial jeopardy.
The Henrys did not have connections to keep their gun works from going into
debt, or worse yet going out ofbusiness. Some private contractors did have such
connections. One such contractor, Colonel Simeon North had run into debt with the
federal government after producing contract pistols for over 12 years. In 1815 North
wanted his'pistol contract changed to a musket contract and sought an additional advance
of50,000 dollars to the initial 27,000 dollar advance he had received three years earlier at
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the start ofhis pistol contract. Perhaps he realized the high cost ofclaiming to have
interchangeability when the tools were not yet up to the job. Despite North's debt, the
government did not threaten him with a law suit or similar harassment such as they had
with the Henry family. Instead Wadsworth simply lowered the advance amount requested
and refused to transform his pistol contract into a musket contract. In a letter to Secretary
William H. Crawford Wadsworth mapped out how far he would go to help North.
After taking a full view ofthe subject it seems to me advisable to let the contract
remain on its original footing for a while at least and until the balance against Mr.
North shall be reduced to 15 or 20,000 dollars, when it would not be improper
to arrange some alternative or modification so as to receive a portion ofrifles or
pistols ofa better pattern.
He will need I presume further advances immediately to enable him to get
along with the business said. I would recommend his receiving all the aid which
prudence will justify. The manufacture of small arms in this country does not rest
on so subtle a foundation as is commonly imagined. Many persons have been quite
ruined in that business, and I should be sorry to see the name ofMr. North among
the sufferers, as to the further advance of 50,000 dollars it seems to my view
quite exorbitant[sic]. It may be prudent to allow him 10 or 15 thousand dollars
more. These advances will in fact convert his establishment into a National Armory
as regards the expense for it will be carried on with the public money that under
the serious disadvantages ofhaving it placed beyond the control ofthe national
authorities. [51]
North had been offered a real sweetheart deal by the Federal government. It paid to have
connections. The Henrys were not offered any options such as these to get back on their
feet financially. No deals could be made with the federal government. Just when there
seemed no way out ofthis impending financial disaster, an escape route appeared in the
fonn ofMarine T. Wickham - a man with connections.
It was during these difficulties that Marine T. Wickham, former Master Armorer at
Harpers Ferry from 1808 to 1810 and federal arms inspector from 1811 to 1815, offered
on December 27, 1815 to lease from the Henrys their Noble Street gun works in
Philadelphia. In exchange for the lease Wickham agreed to finish the Henrys' federal
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musket contract. The lease would last for five years and cost Wickham $250. per year in
quarterly payments for the use ofJohn Joseph Henry's "large brick shop in Noble Street
above third, together, the wing and yard attached to it, free ofall encumberances... [52].
Although this timely agreement seems to be an inspector's scam, there is no evidence of
any nefariuos motives on the part ofWickham. The lease terms would help both parties:
The said Wickham hath undertaken to complete and fulfill the same (contract),
provided the United States indulges him with eight months additional time to what
is specified in the original contract. In consideration whereofthe said 1. Joseph
Henry has agreed to pay over to the said Wickham the balance ofthe adv~ce
made to the firm ofthe Henries by the United States and amounting to $5,725.68
in the following manner -to wit - to deliver to the said Wickham all the component
parts ofarms that will answer for the contract, and which the Henries have now on
hand, all the tools, implements ofmaterials which the said Wickham may require,
at a fair price....should any ofthe parts ofarms received by the said Wickham from
the said Henries, prove defective, they are to be returned to the said Henries, and
the amount thereof to be deducted from the said Wickham's account, at the
rate they are charged to him. [53]
There are two major implications to be drawn from this subcontracting provision
between Wickham and the Henrys. First, Wickham may have seen the Henrys' weapons
and musket parts as high quality and thus felt comfortable using them in his production of
muskets. If this was the case then the harsh judgment offederal inspectors like Williams
was indeed unwarranted. The second implication is that Wickham may have thought as a
former federal arms inspector, he would have less trouble with the federal inspectors, their
harsh scrutiny and political infighting. After all Wickham was an insider who was familiar
with all aspects ofmusket production and , more importantly, federal inspection
requirements and how to pass them.
Wickham easily obtained approval for the contract transition from the Ordnance
Department and even received an advance equaling a dollar per musket to make the
transition less painful financially. [54] As Captain Jonathan Morton ofthe Ordnance
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Department wrote to Wickham on August 12, 1816~ '·The only remedy that may possibly
remain practicable \s in the way ofan advance. Ifyou will therefore state the smallest sum
you can make out with and the smallest time in which you can reimburse it ( for the same
objection as to partial repayments will exist with the accountant) Colonel Bomford will
use all the interest or influence he may have in procuring it to be allowed."[55] Obviously
being an insider with the Ordnance Department had its advantages.
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Figure 3: Internal diagram o/Iock mechanism/rom J.J. Henry's sketchbook
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The Henrys immediately went to work producing parts for Wickham's muskets at
both their gun works at Boulton and Philadelphia. The Henry account books from 1816 to
1830 show parts ranging from simple items such as barrel bands, springs, gun stocks and
ramrods to more complex pieces like lock plates, barrels and lock mechanisms (see Figure
[3] Internal diagram oflock mechanism J.J. Henry) An 1823 order sent to Wickham
consisted of finished locks, rollers, swivels, triggers, bullet molds and bridles, each item
sent in lots ofa dozen or more.[56] The various parts being manufactured and shipped to
Wickham were mostly finished parts which indicates that Wickham would not need an
extensive amount of fitters and finishers. [57] The parts were readily accept~d by Wickham
and he was willing to put his name on the finished product. Surely Wickham would not
have done this had the Henrys' gun parts been poorly made . The final judgment is of
course that the muskets, equipped with Henry parts passed the federal inspectors which
begs the question: Did the Henrys get out ofmartial arms production too soon? Was it
simply Wickham's connections with the Ordnance Department, or might the Henrys have
done equally well on their own?
Records indicate that a large portion ofthe parts sent to Wickham were barrels.
During the period from 1816 to 1822 the Ordnance Department was most concerned with
the uniformity ofmusket barrels. Even though lock mechanisms were the most intricate
part ofthe musket, Ordnance Department inspectors felt they could be more easily
checked than barrels especially after the introduction ofuniform gauges in 1816. Another
reason why so much interest was placed on barrel specifications and standardization was
cost. The barrel was the most costly part ofthe musket in both raw materials and man
labor hours. [58] The expense remained high throughout this period. The Henrys cost per
barrel was $2.60 in 1816 and $2.75 in 1822 [59] Henry's financial record ofJanuary 1,
1822 illustrates the high cost involved:
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100 skelps each 10 Ibs of iron at $100 per ton -cost
Welding 100 barrels
Coal (store of chemical) for welding
Boating {sp} 100 barrels sufficiently smooth
Grinding
Grindstone ware
Mill ware oftools
Oil, tao and tallow
Charcoal for heating, rolling and making of repairs
Iron and steel for repairing tools, augers
Proving barrels ofpowder
Two per limit lot {?}
Store ofwelding {?} wood
Superintendent's wages
"Expense of manufacturing rifle barrels" one hundred
$50.00
$46.00
$20.00
$30.00
$12.00
$ 6.00
$15.00
$ 1.50
$ 2.25
$ 3.00
$ 4.00
$ 5.00
$ 1.50
m.oo.
$228.0
All of the parts produced by the Henrys at Boulton and Philadelphia required filing
and fitting before being sent to Wickham. Much ofthe Henrys' contract work was done at
the Boulton gun works. The gun works was two and a half stories high with a water wheel
to provide power for grinding and polishing operations. It housed 72 workers who
engaged in jobs ranging from the forging, welding and turning ofbarrels to the filing and
finishing ofparts.[60] Although such finishing work such as this was common even in the
larger armories such as Springfield and Harpers Ferry, what was uncommon was that the
Henrys made extensive use ofinexperienced pieceworkers most ofwhom were trained by
William Henry himself
"The young men I employed in the business were such as had served
apprenticeships in other professions and who in expectation ofbetter wages
consented to go into the Gun making business. One was a tanner (Ed Warner) who
turned out in the end an excellent lock filer, another (Jonothan Ehrenhard) had
received some instruction in Rifle making acquired a knowledge oflock filing with
me. Another, a tailor, (Jonothan Nischman) became a lock filer, in short all ofthe
hands were almost totally ignorant ofthe business."[61]
In spite ofthis Henry was able to tum these apprentices into skilled workers and "it may be
possible that some ofthe lathe operators who turned and rifled barrels also came from this
stock ofworkers.
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Apparently many ofthe workers at Boulton did their filing and finishing work at
home. This cottage industry ofpieceworkers became widespread in the area north of
Nazareth which is still referred to by locals as "Filetown" because ofthe lock filers who
once lived and worked there.[62] The same situation holds true with Stockertown an area
where stock fitters lived. Some workers lived on properties owned by the Henry family.
An 1823 rental agreement between a finisher named John Right and the Henrys stipulated
the terms for the artisan "He is to pay eighteen dollars per year for the house. Keep the
fences in good working order and make use ofthe dung in his gardens, ofany glass broke
he is to put them in on his own expence. I on my past promised him, pasture for one cow
during the summers season in the bargain, he is to only live in the said house as long as he
is in my employ."[63] Although it was not uncommon for a whole community of artisans
to live around a gun works such as at Harpers Ferry, Springfield and the Frankford
Armory, it is impressive that such villages evolved along the Bushkill Creek indicating that
the small family gun works at Boulton had grown into a community enterprise.
Many ofthe parts crafted by the Boulton workers were shipped to John Joseph
Henry's Philadelphia gun works where the muskets were assembled and shipped out under
Wickham's leasing agreement. Records reveal that barrels and stocks went out to
Wickham in lots of 100 or more on a bimonthly basis. An 1823 order gave the following
barrel specifications: "152 ofBodine welding and made ofJuniatta iCon, and marked with
a small R on one ofthe flat sides ofthe breech. 12 ofthe barrels were ground by Yoke and
marked with a small R on the round part ofthe breech. II[64] These breech markings were
proofmarks indicating that these barrels were finished prior to shipment. Although the
barrel was the most costly part of the musket to produce, records show that these artisans
hired by the Henrys to fit and finish the muskets proved to be the most costly aspect of
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musket production. John Joseph Henry listed the cost for making a single musket in 1816
as follows:
Barrel from Barrel maker $2.60
Barrel loop righted $ .11
Barrel polished and bayonet fixed $ .18
Lock finished $2.27
Stocks in the ruff {sp} $ .22
Stocks finished $1.03
Mountings finished $1.04
Ramrods finished $ .43
Bayonet finished $ .68
Finishing the musket $ .23
Tightening band and screws $ .22
Filing swivels L.Q.1
$8.94
Pay for boxes and as below stated overhead t....1Q.
$9.64
It seems that despite the drive for interchangeable parts no one from the federal arsenals
down to the private contractors had come up with a way to achieve such parts without the
use offinishers and filers. Out of the total $9.64 for musket production costs, $6.82, or 71
percent ofthe Henrys costs went to pay skilled artisans who labored not to make precise
machine tooled interchangeable parts but to fit and finish highly individual, hand crafted
uniform parts. [65] Since precision tools had not been developed for interchangeable parts
production, these "hand crafted" parts became the closest thing to machine tooled
standardization ofparts and such production techniques became the norm at most
armories. [66]
The Henrys arrangement to do this extensive subcontracting work for Wickham
freed them from the direct scrutiny of federal inspectors and provided them with the
flexibility to pursue other state and local contracts for the production ofsmall arms,
gun parts and accoutrements ranging from swords to leather goods such as cartridge
boxes. The Henrys also refurbished and sold used equipment. Such diversification was
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found at other gun works and arsenals such as the Frankford Arsenal and the Springfield
Armory.[67] Overall what the Henrys had done was "buck the system".
Although the trend for gun manufacturers was toward large scale production offederal
contract muskets and the creation of standardized parts, the Henrys chose an alternate
path to success. Through diversification, small scale contracts and subcontracting for
federal contract musket producers, the Henrys were able to overcome their earlier
contract problems and thrive in an era when many family gun works were going under.
For the Henry gun works this diversification was not only a key to their survival
but it also supported a network oflocal gunsmiths . It has long been the beliefthat most
artisans who crafted the famous Pennsylvania longrifles did so from scratch, creating each
part ofthe musket individually. [68] Each rifle produced by a Pennsylvania Longrifle
craftsmen was a work ofart, as unique as the gunsmith who produced it. The gunstocks
were made ofhard woods such as maple and shaped by hand, often incorporating rococo
designs and ornate silver inlays. Gunsmiths hand forged the barrels, lockplates and other
hardware. By the early 1800's this hand crafted production ofthe longrifle was changing in
the Lehigh Valley area. It seems the Lehigh Valley school ofgunsmiths was beginning to
incorporate pre-made musket parts into their weapons. It is unclear whether this was
happening in other regions. It is also unclear as to why gunsmiths were doing this except
perhaps as a response to the increasing competition from larger gun works. What the
records do show is that Lehigh Valley gunsmiths were purchasing large numbers of
finished and unfinished barrels and stocks from the Henry gun works. [69]
The Henry facility served the needs ofgunsmiths throughout the Lehigh Valley
(see Figure [4J : Map ofNorthhampton County). All ofthese gun works were small in
size - they rarely employed more than one apprentice or family member as well as the
"gunsmith. Tax records and estate inventories ofthese gunsmiths reveal various amounts of
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gun parts. John Young, for example had, a considerable inventory ofbarrels, locks, stocks
and other parts. Many ofthese parts coincide with Henry sales records to Young. [70]
Almost all ofthe gunsmiths in the Lehigh Valley, moreover, ordered goods from the
Henry gun works from 1790 to 1840. Barrels and gun locks were purchased most often in
great numbers but the gunsmiths also bought screws and smaller parts for musket
production.[71] These transactions show that the Henry gun works was in a unique
situation providing finished parts for both the larger federal contract system of
standardization and for the smaller independent gunsmith artisans ofthe Lehigh Valley.
The Henrys were part ofthe vanguard ofthe "modem" armaments industry ofthe
nineteenth century but also closely tied to skilled gunsmiths whose craft was in its twilight
years.
The Henrys also did contract work for individuals and states. The items produced
ranged from complete small arms to finished parts and small arms accoutrements. Even
prior to their subcontracting for Wickham, the Henrys were producing weapons and parts
for many individuals. In 1811, J. Bolivar (the brother ofGeneral Simon Bolivar ofBolivia)
purchased "250 muskets at $12.00 per pair, 10,000 gun flints for $50.00 and 500 musket
locks at $2.75 per lock." [72] Many ofthese muskets had been assembled from parts that
had been condemned by federal inspectors. From 1815 to the mid 1820's,the Henrys also
produced a small number ofbarrels for Samuel Colt and John H. Hall who both later
became leaders in the arms industry, manufacturing repeating and breech loading weapons.
In December, 1815 John Joseph Henry wrote to William Henry stating "I received a letter
from a person named Hall who lives in Portland Massachusetts, he wants me to furnish
him with 30 barrels every month and payable here." [73] Both Hall and Colt later
espoused true machine based interchangeabiltiy, although both evidently were willing to
forgo such things early in their careers. Henry Derringer, famous for his pistols, also
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ordered 28 musket barrels and 35 stocks from John Joseph Henry in 1821.[74] The
Henrys even got involved in the Caribbean trade. An invoice from John 1. Henry's day
book states "eight cases ofmuskets and pistols shipped by me on board the Brig Charlotte
Lawsmen. Captain Olmsted bound for St. Bartholemew and St. Thomas
consigned to Mr. Christian Goldmain, merchant. "[75] A total of72 American pattern
muskets, 60 English pattern muskets and 25 pairs ofbrass handled pistols were consigned
to Mr. Goldmain.[76]
To complement these markets, the Henrys even operated a second hand musket
and military equipment bu~iness. They bought used equipment and refurbished it before
selling it to various state and private contractors. In 1816, John Joseph Henry offered the
party ofJ and B Cooper"500 second hand horsemen's swords with leather scabbards
which I will sell low for each ... at $5.50. "[77] Records indicate various state and local
contracts for items such as used muskets and equipment. Such dealings in refurbished
goods was also done at the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia during this time period. [78]
Through diversification oftheir gun works, the Henrys were able to tap into many markets
for weapons that larger federal contract musket .producers had by-passed. Although not
a1ways.as high paying as federal contracts, some would prove just as exclusive
guaranteeing the Henrys a market and buyer for many years.
To support this business, the Henry's consolidated their operations when William
sold his share ofthe Boulton gun works to his brother John Joseph who in 1822, almost
immediately closed the Philadelphia facilities and consolidated production at Boulton. This
closing ofthe facility, however, did not end the Henrys association with Wickham or other
buyers in Philadelphia. The production ofbarrels and other musket parts for local
gunsmiths was also thriving. Contract work for these parties would continue only now it
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was centralized at Boulton where the Henrys had apparently established an extensive gun
works capable ofcompleting both their original sub-contracting work for Wickham and
new diverse contract projects. It seems that contractors for such work sought the Henrys
out. The Henrys also contacted prospective clients to obtain contract work.
By 1826 they had received a new series ofcontracts, not for military muskets, but
for "trade guns" which were to be used by fur trappers as part of their trade exchanges
with Indians. The Henrys sold guns to distributors in Pittsburgh, Ohio and points west of
the Mississippi River via John Jacob and William Astor's American Fur Company. [79]
The trade gun was patterned after the "North West" gun which had been made in England
since the early eighteenth century. It was a serviceable weapon whose distinctive features
included an oversized trigger guard (to enable the user to shoot with gloves on), an
octagonal tapering to round barrel and a sideplate of a serpent design. [80] The trade gun
was distinctive also because ofthe ornate patterns engraved into the patchbox, lockplate
and other metal parts ofthe gun. (see Figures [5&6J 1.1. Henry Lock & Plate Designs)
These designs were meant to attract and impress the Indians who would trade fur pelts for
these guns. thousands ofthese guns were made but few have survived the harsh conditions
ofthe Am~rican frontier, while others were destroyed in the various Indian wars waged by
the U.S. government during the nineteenth century.
The Henry sales to the American Fur Company numbered between 50 and 150
rifles per month. Two types ofrifles dominate the orders; those ofthe American pattern
and those ofthe English pattern. The cost ofthese muskets by 1837 was $9.50 for
American pattern muskets and $11.50 for the English pattern muskets. [81] The difference
in cost was from the external ornate scroll work and barrel shape found on the English
muskets. Internally these muskets were relatively the same in quality and function. In
Indian trade however the external appearance ofthe musket was as important as its
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internal workings. This fact was pointed out by the American Fur Company in an 1837
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Peter Young
John Young Sr.
John Young Jr.
Jacob Carrel
Peter Kuntz
Jacob Kuntz
Peter Newhardt
Daniel Kliest
HermanRupp
Easton
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Smith Gap. Blue Mt.
Whitehall Twp.
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N. Whitehall Twp.
Bethlehem
Weisenberg Twp.
JohnRupp
Issac Berlin
Henry qun Works
Hemy Albright
John Edmund
Andrew Albright
Jacob Hines
Peter Moll
Jacob Moll
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Lehigh Twp.
Jacobsburg & Boulton
Nazareth
Bushkill Twp.
Moore Twp.
Moore Twp.
Hellertown
Allentown
FIgUre 4: GunsmiJhs o/the Lehigh VaHey (1790-1840) Map courtesy Northampton County
Library. Gunsmith locations from County tax and will l'etords
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Figure So' Patch box designs for trade gunsfrom J.J. Henry's sketchbook
letter: "We have opened one box ofeach sort and find the scroll guard to be as good as
ever> but the outside ofthe barrels of the Lancaster pattern have so many flaws as will
injure their sale; for the Indians cannot be pursuaded {sic} that such external imperfection
does not extend to the interior ofthe rifle. We therefore beg you will see that those you
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send are as free as possible from this objection."[82] There were other slight problems
with some ofthe trade guns sent such as when guns shipped were received damp and wet
because the Henrys used unseasoned wood for their packing cases. [83] Such problems
however did not hinder the trade gun sales to the American Fur Company and the Henrys
continued to receive large orders for these weapons throughout the 1840's.
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Figure 6: II Henry Iockplatefrom J.J. Henry's sketchbook
In the 1850's the Henrys were still producing weapons for the fur trade and small
gunsmiths and by mid decade were producing Parts for Philip S. Justice ofPhiladelphia
who had obtained several 'state and federal contracts for martial arms. It is unclear as to
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why Justice, a private contractor, was able to succeed where the Henrys had failed.
Perhaps he had achieved limited interchangeabilty in his production ofmuskets. The
parts provided by the Henrys consisted oftriggers, rifle wipers (ramrods), and stocks none
ofwhich require true interchangeability to be used in production. The Justice sales records
for 1856 indicate they purchased 591 various triggers, 445 wipers and 37 complete
shotguns.[84] It is worth noting that the Henrys also produced finished rifles for the
Justice firm shipping out 696 rifles ofvarious sizes. [85] Was interchangeability still not the
key to fulfilling government contracts providing you had the right connections in the
Ordnance Department? Perhaps Justice had such connections. By 1859 the Henrys were
-
also doing subcontract work for Phelps Beau consisting ofmore triggers and wipers and
48 half stock rifles. [86] But orders such as these began to dwindle and this marked the
beginning ofthe end for the Henry gun works.
The Henrys were no longer getting contract work from the American fur Company
as the fur trading industry had dried up by 1859 and the orders from Justice and other
martial arms producers had become infrequent and small in size. One reason for this was
the immense growth ofthe Federal Armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry which by
1859 were producing on a scale that most other gun makers could not hope to achieve.
This growth was due mostly to increased federal and state demand for rifled muskets and
percussion system weapons that were developed in the 1840's. The private arms market
was still small. But just as important to the federal Armories' growth was their ability to
purchase and use accurate machine tools and lathes to not only increase production but
also create limited interchangeability ofweapons parts. The smaller gun works could not
compete on such a scale and only a handful such as Savage, Colt and Remington were able
to survive and thrive beyond the Civil War. Many ofthe smaller gun manufacturers that
the Henrys sold parts and weapons to went out ofbusiness. The Henrys themselves would
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continue to produce parts for Justice during the first years ofthe Civil War but ultimately
they could not reach or create enough markets, even during the war, to stay competitive.
By the Civil War most larger armories and gun works had enough money to invest
in quality machine tools which provided for the first time in the gun industry limited but
none the less machine based interchangeability ofparts. As early as 1833 the Springfield
Armory had increased annual production from 7,000 muskets to 16,500 muskets and
annual musket output per worker jumped from 35.2 to 63.8 through the introduction of
Blanchard's stock lathe alone.[87] Add to that the introduction ofmilling machines and
other tools which would drastically reduce the amount ofhand finishing involved in the
production process and consequently improve uniformity and production output. The
Henrys and other small gun works could not afford such machine tools which aided in
mass production ofthe weapons. Thus smaller works which still relied heavily on hand
finishing ofparts could not keep up with the demands of industrialized war production and
the needs ofthe Union army. Although some larger European armories had not yet
achieved true machine based interchangeablity such as the Enfield works in England, they
could still compete because oftheir size and production output and soon they too had
introduced machine tools into their production [88] Smaller gun works without the capital
to reinvest in machine tools were unable to modernize and were doomed.
Conclusion
Although it seems ironic, the Civil War marked the end ofthe Henry gun works'
production ofmartial arms, right at a time when the market for such weapons had grown
because ofthe war. But the Civil War not only created a demand for rifles but also a
demand for higher quality rifles and weapons with improved technological features such as
40
repeating rifles and breech loading capabilities. By the middle ofthe war many gun
manufacturers like P.S. Justice found that their weapons were no longer wanted by the
Federal government which labeled such rifles as the two banded Justice short rifle as sub-
standard.[89] For smaller gun works like the Henrys the cancellation oftheir
suboontracting work was devastating. Although the Henrys did not go out ofbusiness
during the war they cut back production extensively and after 1865 ran limited
productions ofhunting shotguns and small caliber non-martial rifles. [90] By the early
1900's the Henry gun works ceased production forever, a victim ofthe very thing William
Henry had tried in vain to achieve in the early 1800's - machine based interchangeability.
Unlike other nineteenth century gun makers such as Colt, Springfield and
Remington, the Henrys did not survive as a company past the first decade ofthe twentieth
century but their story was still one ofgreat endurance and adaptability. At a time when
federal muSket contracts were the key to success and standardization ofparts required
rigorous and drastically different inspection standards, the Henrys suffered through the
worst this period had to offer and bounced back. Through diversification and
subcontracting work the Henrys survived and even prospered. This transitional period for
American gun makers from craft to industry marked the demise ofmany small gun works
but the Henrys were able to thrive using what by today's standards seems a strange mix of
industrial production with hand finishing and fitting ofparts..The Henry family provided
jobs for artisans in the Lehigh Valley and Philadelphia from 1813 to
1860. They enabled Marine T. Wickham to fulfill his federal musket contracts. Their
inexpensive trade rifles allowed the American Fur Company and the Astor family in
particular to profit and succeed in trading with Native Americans. And finally their
distribution ofgun barrels and parts to local gunsmiths kept many ofthese craftsmen
in business at a time when they would otherwise lost out to larger gun makers.
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The Henry gun works are history but the Henry family's combination of quality artisan
work with industrial production and diversification touched many lives and proved that
there were still "Davids" who could buck the trends ofthe day and survive in a world of
Industrial "Goliaths".
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